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Abstract 
By using a data set of academic economists from Japanese universities, we estimated the effect of refereed articles on 
salary, promotion and labor mobility. Results show no effect of refereed articles on salary and on promotion. 
However, there is a statistically significant effect of refereed articles on labor mobility, though the magnitude of the 
effect is rather small. Publishing one additional refereed article increases the probability that an academic has worked 
in exactly two universities by 0.4%. In addition, publishing one additional refereed article in the US or Europe 
increases the probability that an academic has worked in exactly two universities by 1%. Refereed articles published in 
Japan have no statistically significant impact on the probability of working in more universities. We conclude that 
publishing refereed articles does not reward Japanese economists by a direct increase in salary and accelerated 
promotion. Our results are thus consistent with the beliefs within Japanese academia that publications do not affect 
salary or promotion.
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     1. Introduction
When you talk to economists from Japanese universities you typically hear that articles pub-
lished in refereed journals do not count for salary and promotion. Japanese economists commonly
believe that salary is a deterministic function of age, education and experience, and that promo-
tion is automatically done based on age, education and experience.1 However, there has been no
study that investigates the veracity of these beliefs. Since the literature on academics from the
US and the UK ¯nds rewards for publishing refereed articles, it is di±cult to believe that refer-
eed articles have no tangible rewards, like an increase in salary or accelerated promotion within
Japanese academia.
The most tangible rewards for publishing refereed articles would be an increase in salary and
an increase in the probability of promotion. However, publishing refereed articles could also have
other tangible rewards such as an increase in labor mobility. An increase in labor mobility could
allow academics to move to more prestigious universities or to universities that o®er a better
research environment. In addition, an increase in labor mobility o®ers more °exibility in choosing
the place to live. Therefore, in this paper we estimate the e®ect of publishing refereed articles
on salary, promotion, and labor mobility, in order to investigate whether or not refereed articles
have any tangible rewards within the academic labor market in Japan. We use a data set that
we collected via a mail survey administered in 2008. We surveyed only academic economists. For
each academic in our sample, our data contain detailed personal, job, institutional and human
capital characteristics that allow us to control for various determinants of salary, promotion, and
mobility within Japanese academia.
To preview our results, we found no e®ect of refereed articles on salary and on promotion;
a result consistent with the belief that publications do not generally a®ect salary and promotion
within Japanese academia. However, we found a statistically signi¯cant e®ect of refereed articles
on labor mobility. Publishing refereed articles increases labor mobility, though the e®ect is rather
small.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 deals with the e®ect of refereed articles on salary. Section 5 examines the e®ect of
refereed articles on rank attainment. Section 6 investigates the e®ect of refereed articles on labor
mobility, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
Why do academics publish refereed articles? According to the literature, there are several
types of returns that may be realized by publishing refereed articles.2
First, empirical research documents that refereed articles bring an increase in salary for aca-
demics within the US and the UK academia. Katz (1973) ¯nds that one article increased annual
salary by $18 and one top journal article increased annual salary by $102 in 1969, when the aver-
age annual male salary was $16,078. Broder (1993), in a study of professional achievements and
gender salary di®erences of academic economists in the US, shows that there is an increase in
salary by 3.4% for every additional top journal article, indicating that an article in a top journal
1According to interviews conducted by the authors. We interviewed several academics and representatives of
the Association of Private Universities of Japan (Nihon Shiritsu Daigaku Kyoukai) and of the Faculty and Sta®
Union of Japanese Universities (Zenkouku Daigaku Kosen Kyoshokuin Kumiai).
2Note that non-monetary returns like praise and prestige, advancement of knowledge, etc resulting from pub-
lishing refereed articles are not considered in this paper.
1can be worth as much a $2,129 per year at the average annual salary level. Ward (2001) utilizes a
sample of UK academics to investigate the gender salary gap. Her results show that publishing one
additional refereed article increases salary by 0.2%. Blackaby et al. (2005) also ¯nd a statistically
signi¯cant e®ect of refereed articles weighted by quality on the salary of UK academics. Moore et
al. (2007), in a comparative study of academic pay within US and UK economics departments,
¯nd that refereed articles published in top-tier and second-tier economic journals yield rewards in
terms of salary. An additional top-tier article would increase annual salary by 2.5% in the US and
by 1.1% in the UK, while an additional second-tier article raises annual salary by 0.7% in the US.
Second, within US and UK universities, academics are rewarded for publishing refereed articles
in terms of promotion. Ginther and Khan (2004), by using a sample of economists from the
American Economic Association (AEA) examine gender di®erence in the probability of attaining
tenure at ten years post PhD. They ¯nd that the probability of being promoted to tenure is 3.7%
higher for academics who publish in top-ten journals. Publications in other type of journals do
not signi¯cantly a®ect the probability of achieving tenure. Similarly, Ginther and Hayes (2003)
using a sample from the US Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR) in humanities estimate gender
promotion di®erences. They show that an increase in the number of refereed articles increases the
probability of achieving tenure by 4.1% for all cohorts in the sample, while for the 1980-89 cohort
it increases the probability of achieving tenure by as much as 7.9%. McDowell et al. (2001), by
using a sample of economists from the AEA directory show that refereed articles are signi¯cant
determinants of the probability of promotion. Their results show that an increase in the number
of `e®ective' refereed articles (refereed articles weighted by quality) increases the probability of
promotion to full professor by 3%.
Third, faculty mobility might be a®ected through research productivity. Ault et al. (1979)
studied labor market mobility for academic economists from the US. According to their results,
publishing one extra refereed article in a quality journal increases the institutional rating of the
second job by 0.3%. They argue that refereed articles are the principal means by which an
academic can move to a more prestigious department. Allison and Long (1987) analyzed the
interuniversity mobility of academic scientists in the US. They found that the number of refereed
articles is one of the determinants of the prestige of the next destination department. A change
from zero to sixteen refereed articles brings an increase in destination prestige of 40 points on a
scale of 500. Coupe et al. (2005) also ¯nd that the probability of upward mobility is positively
related to the past production of refereed articles. However, the e®ect of refereed articles on
upward mobility is very small; publishing one extra refereed article increases the probability of
moving to a higher rank university by only 0.04%.
3. Data
The data utilized in this project were obtained from a survey we administered via a postal
questionnaire. Our survey method is presented below.
First, from the website of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT) we obtained an o±cial list of all four-year universities in Japan (747 uni-
versities). We accessed each university website provided in the list in order to collect the names
of academics in economics and economics-related departments.3 We were able to collect 4353
names from 132 universities.4 Next, from the 4353 collected names, we selected 1863 academics
3Often economics departments are combined with business departments to form a larger department. In this
case, names from the business departments were also included.
4Many Japanese economics departments also employ faculty specializing in language education; we eliminated
2and mailed them questionnaires directly. These data were initially collected to investigate various
gender di®erences within the academic labor market in Japan; thus, we over sampled females.
We selected all the female-sounding names (287 names); however, the rest of the selected aca-
demics (1576 names) were randomly chosen. Questionnaires were sent from April to June 2008
and participants could reply either by mail or online. Two reminders were sent out by mail in
July and August, and an additional reminder was sent to approximately 600 academics by email.
At the end of our survey period, we received 363 responses (252 by mail and 111 online). Thus,
we achieved a rate of response of 19.5%. However, the usable sample is 337.
Regarding the representativeness of our data one may have a number of concerns. First, one
may be concerned with over representation of full professors due to non-random responses, since in
typical mail surveys of academics such a problem is not uncommon (Blackaby et al. 2005; Moore
et al. 2007). In our sample, 63% of respondents are full professors. However, according to the
MEXT Statistics of School Education data 60% of academics in economics departments in Japan
were full professors in 2007. Thus, the di®erence is relatively minor for our sample.5 Second,
one may be concerned with the under sampling of private universities. We under sampled private
universities because the MEXT does not provide website links for a signi¯cant number of private
universities. According to the MEXT Statistics of School Education, 73% of academic economists
work in private universities while only 59% of our sample works in private universities. Finally,
the percentage of females in our sample is 16.9%. Based on the statistics provided by the MEXT
Statistics of School Education, the percentage of females in economics departments in Japan was
12.6% in 2007; thus, we over sampled females. Over sampling of females was purposely done,
as already explained. Over sampling of minority groups is not uncommon in the literature. For
example, McDowell et al. (2001) used data which over sampled females.
4. Estimation of the e®ect of refereed articles on salary
4.1 Empirical method
The e®ect of refereed articles on salary is estimated by using a standard earning equation:
Log(Annual Salary)i = ®
0Zi + ¯(Articles)i + ²i; (1)
where Zi is the vector of variables that directly a®ect annual salary (i.e., human capital character-
istics and other objective salary determinants). (Articles) is the total number of refereed articles
published over the academic career. We also estimated the same model where we separated articles
published in Japan (ArticlesJp) and the US and Europe (ArticlesUs).
It is likely that the current base salary is determined by the previous year's academic perfor-
mance while the current year bonus is determined by the current year's performance. Therefore,
ideally, the salary equation should contain the lag of (Articles) as well as the current year's (Ar-
ticles). Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we could not include the lag of (Articles).
Since the current year's (Articles) are correlated with the lag of (Articles), the current year's
(Articles) would capture the e®ect of lag of (Articles) as well, but only partially. Thus, our model
may understate the combined e®ects of the current year's (Articles) and the lag of (Articles).
such faculty where possible. In addition, we excluded universities that accept only female students.
5In Blackaby et al. (2005) 28.5% of their sample are full professors, while the representation of full professors
in the population is only 18.8% (UK)(p.3). Similarly, Moore et al. (2007) have 37.3% as full professors in their
sample from the UK, while the representation of full professors in the population is only 18.8% (p.4-5).
3Table 1 shows the de¯nitions of our variables. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the total annual salary. Explanatory variables include various personal, job, institutional, and
human capital characteristics. (Articles) is the variable of our interest and it includes the total
number of refereed articles published over the academic career. The number of refereed articles
is the most accepted measure of scholarly research output within academia (Taylor et al., 2006).
The number of co-authored refereed articles is divided by two, assuming that most of co-authored
articles have two authors. In the prior literature, the quality of research output is controlled
for by distinguishing articles published in top journals. In our survey, in order to preserve the
anonymity of the respondents, we did not ask the name of the journal of publication. Therefore,
we cannot directly adjust for the quality of the article. However, we asked the survey participants
to report the number of publications according to the location of the publisher. Thus, each type
of article is further divided into subtypes depending on whether it was published in Japan or in
the US/Europe. We expect that articles published in the US or Europe are more cited than those
published in Japan since these are published mostly in Japanese. Thus, we can capture potential
di®erences in the impact of the refereed articles.
One potential problem in our estimation is that the number of articles may be endogenous. For
example, omitted unobserved characteristics such as the ability of academics maybe be correlated
with the number of articles. Moreover, the number of articles may be reported with errors which
would cause error-in-variable biases. Although we have a limited number of instruments (father's
education and mother's education), we address the endogeneity issues in a two stage least square
procedure (2SLS).
Summary statistics. Table 2 includes a summary statistics for the variables included in all
estimations. The average number of total refereed articles published over the academic career is
7.5; the average number published in Japan is 5.7 and the average number published in the US,
Europe and other countries combined is 1.7. Thus, the academics in our sample publish more
refereed articles in Japan than in the US and Europe. 63% of our sample are full professors while
29% are associate professors. 65% of academics in our sample have a PhD degree. The greatest
number of academics (18%) specialize in history of economic thought 13% of academics specialize
in business, 7% in international economics, and 8% in labor economics.
4.2 Estimation results
Let us ¯rst discuss the endogeneity in the number of articles. We use father's education,
mother's education, mother's education squared, and mother's education times father's education
as instrumental variables in a two stage least square procedure (2SLS).6 Column one in Table 6
shows the ¯rst stage results. All the coe±cients for the excluded instruments are highly statistically
signi¯cant, except for father's education which is only marginally signi¯cant. The F-test rejects
the null hypothesis that the coe±cients for the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero at the
5% signi¯cance level (p-value=0.039). Thus, the instruments appear to be signi¯cant determinants
of the refereed articles. Hansen's overidenti¯cation test statistics is 6.53, with degrees of freedom
equal to 3 (p-value=0.088). Thus, the overindenti¯cation test does not reject the validity of the
instruments at the 5% signi¯cance level (that is, instruments are uncorrelated with the error
terms). Therefore, our choice of instruments appears to be correct. Based on the validity of the
instruments, we test the possible exogeneity of the refereed articles. The test is the C-statistic
test which follows Â2
(1) (Hayashi 2000:220). The test statistic is 0.61 (p-value=0.432). Therefore,
6De¯nitions of the instrumental variables are presented in Table 1. Preliminary results indicated that father's
education squared is not signi¯cant, thus we excluded this variable from the model.
4we do not reject the exogeneity of the refereed articles, thus the test statistic does not support the
use of the 2SLS. Therefore, in the following we base our discussion on the OLS results.
We estimated two OLS models. OLS 1 uses the total number of articles, (Articles), as our
publication variable. OLS 2 di®erentiates between articles published in Japan, (ArticlesJp), and
articles published in the US and Europe, (ArticlesUs). The ¯rst column in Table 3 presents the
results of the model OLS 1. The coe±cient for the refereed articles variable is small (0.0007) and
statistically insigni¯cant, indicating that refereed articles have no e®ect on the salary within the
economics departments in Japan. The second column in Table 3 presents the results of OLS 2.
The coe±cients for (ArticlesJp) and (ArticlesUs) are small, (0.0005) and (0.002) respectively,
and not statistically signi¯cant. Thus, neither type of article has an e®ect on salary.
It should be noted that our publication measures are not fully `quality adjusted', although we
have attempted to capture the quality di®erences in publications by separating articles published
in Japan and in the US/Europe. However, there are still large di®erences in the article quality
within each region. Thus, our results may understate the e®ect of `quality adjusted' publications
on salary. However, many previous studies for the US and UK academia used quality un-adjusted
articles, but found a positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ect of publications on salary (Monks
and Robinson 2000; Ward 2001). Thus, our results strongly indicate that academic economists in
Japan are rewarded much less than the economists in the US and the UK for publishing refereed
articles.
Our estimation results show that there is a 6% salary premium for those who obtained a
PhD from overseas. In addition, there are some statistically signi¯cant e®ects of the areas of
specialization. It is possible that publishing refereed articles is indirectly rewarded in terms of
the salary premiums for a PhD from overseas or for areas of specialization. In order to check
this possibility, we dropped (PhDOverseas) and all the areas dummies from the OLS 1 and OLS
2. In OLS 1, the coe±cient for (Articles) is unchanged at 0.001(p-value=0.37). In OLS 2, the
coe±cients for (ArticlesJp) and (ArticlesUs) are almost unchanged at 0.0004(p-value=0.61) and
0.002(p-value=0.53), respectively. In fact, the correlation between the publication measures and
the dropped variables is very weak.7
Although we rejected the endogeneity of articles, it is still interesting to look at the coe±cients
of the 2SLS estimation. Column three in Table 3 shows the results. We estimated the 2SLS model
only for the total number of refereed articles. The coe±cient for (Articles) is small and statistically
insigni¯cant (0.004). The other coe±cients do not change appreciably when compared with OLS
1 and OLS 2.
In sum, our results indicate that refereed articles have no e®ect on salary. Thus, our results
are consistent with the commonly held beliefs among Japanese academics that refereed articles
are not determinants of salary.
5. Estimation of the e®ect of refereed articles on rank attainment
5.1 Empirical method
In order to estimate the e®ect of refereed articles on the probability of achieving a certain rank
we use an ordered probit rank equation. Let (Rank) be the rank variable, such that (Rank)=1 if
associate professor, 2 if full professor and 0 if assistant professor or lecturer. Then, we estimate
7The correlation between (ArticlesUs) and (PhDOverseas) is 0.25. The correlation between (ArticlesUs) and
(International) is 0.25. Any other correlations are less than 10%.




0Zi + µ(Articles)i + ¹i; (2)
where y¤ is a latent variable such that, (Rank)i=0 if y¤
i < c1, (Rank)i=1 if c1 · y¤
i < c2, and
(Rank)i=2 if y¤
i ¸ c2. Zi is the vector of variables that directly a®ect promotion probabilities. In
the rank equation we use the same explanatory variables as in the salary equation, assuming that
the variables that a®ect salary would also a®ect promotion. Since articles may be endogeneous in
the rank equation, we also estimate the rank equation in a linear two stage least square estimation
with parents' education as instruments.8
5.2 Estimation results
Let us ¯rst discuss the endogeneity in the number of articles. Results of the ¯rst stage
regression for the linear 2SLS rank attainment regression are presented in column two in Table
6. Two coe±cients for the excluded instruments are statistically signi¯cant at the 5% signi¯cance
level, and two coe±cients are only marginally signi¯cant. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis
that the coe±cients for the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero at the 5% signi¯cance
level (p-value=0.052). Thus, the instruments appear to be signi¯cant determinants of the refereed
articles. Hansen's overidenti¯cation test statistics is 1.67, with degree of freedom equal to 3 (p-
value=0.641). Thus, the overindenti¯cation test does not reject the validity of the instruments
at the 5% signi¯cance level. Therefore, our choice of instruments appears to be correct. Based
on the validity of the instruments, we test the possible exogeneity of the refereed articles. The
test statistic is 2.13 (p-value=0.144). Therefore, we do not reject the exogeneity of the refereed
articles, thus the result does not support the use of the 2SLS. As a result, we will treat articles in
the ordered probit model as exogenous.
We estimate two ordered probit models. Ordered Probit 1 uses the total number of articles as
our publication variable while Ordered Probit 2 distinguishes between articles published in Japan
and articles published in the US and Europe. Table 4 shows the results. In Ordered Probit 1, the
coe±cient for the refereed article is small (0.005) and it is not statistically signi¯cant, indicating
that refereed articles do not have an e®ect on rank attainment. In addition, the marginal e®ect
is also small; publishing one additional refereed article increases the probability of promotion by
only 0.3%. In Ordered Probit 2, we estimate the model again by including (ArticlesJp) and
(ArticlesUs). Results are presented in column two in Table 4. The coe±cients for (ArticlesJp)
and (ArticlesUs) are (0.006) and (0.002) respectively, and they are not statistically signi¯cant at
any conventional signi¯cance level. The marginal e®ects indicate that publishing one additional
article in Japan increases the probability of promotion by only 0.2% and publishing one additional
article in the US and Europe increases the probability of promotion by only 0.6%; however, the
e®ects are not statistically signi¯cant. Thus, neither refereed articles published in US/Europe nor
refereed articles published in Japan have an e®ect on rank attainment.
Although we rejected the endogeneity of articles, it is still interesting to look at the coe±cients
of the linear 2SLS estimation. Column three in Table 4 shows the results. In the linear 2SLS
estimation many coe±cients that are signi¯cant in the ordered probit models are not statistically
signi¯cant anymore. The coe±cient for (Articles) is small and statistically insigni¯cant (0.012).
In sum, our results indicate that refereed articles have no e®ect on rank attainment. Thus,
our results are consistent with the commonly held beliefs among Japanese academics that refereed
articles are not determinants of promotion.
8Note that, this is a linear estimation, while the ordered probit is non-linear.
66. Estimation of the e®ect of refereed articles on labor mobility
6.1 Empirical method
The e®ect of refereed articles on labor mobility is estimated by using an ordered probit
model. Let (#Univ worked)i be the variable that shows the number of universities an academic




0Xi + °(Articles) + ºi; (3)
q¤ is a latent variable such that, (#Univ worked)i=1 if q¤
i < c1, (#Univ worked)i=k if
ck¡1 · q¤
i < ck, and (#Univ worked)i=5 if q¤
i ¸ c4 (the maximum number of universities is
5). Xi is the vector of variables that directly a®ect the number of universities at which an
academic has been previously employed. The explanatory variables included in the labor mobility
equation are mostly similar to the salary equation, except that we do not include variables that are
current institution-speci¯c (for example, ¯xed-term contract, the teaching load, the type of current
university, the type of the current department, the characteristics of the current department,
personal grants, and seniority). Since the number of refereed articles could be endogeneous in the
labor mobility equation, we also estimate a linear labor mobility equation in a linear two stage
least square procedure (2SLS) with (#Univ worked) as the dependent variable.
One caveat of our data is that we cannot distinguish between voluntary turnover and forced
turnover. As a result, our labor mobility variable (#Univ worked) may contain job changes
that are not necessarily a `reward' from the point of view of academics. After providing our main
empirical results, we will provide our assessment of the degree to which our labor mobility variable
is `contaminated' with the cases of forced turnover.
6.2 Estimation results
Results of the ¯rst stage estimation are presented in column three in Table 5. The F-test
rejects the null hypothesis that the coe±cients for the excluded instruments are jointly equal to
zero at the 5% signi¯cance level (p-value=0.044). Thus, the instruments appear to be signi¯cant
determinants of the refereed articles. Hansen's overidenti¯cation test statistics is 0.94, with degrees
of freedom equal to 3 (p-value=0.815). Thus, the overindenti¯cation test does not reject the
validity of the instruments at the 5% signi¯cance level. Therefore, our choice of instruments
appears to be correct. Based on the validity of the instruments, we test the possible exogeneity
of the refereed articles. The test statistic is 0.13 (p-value=0.717). Therefore, we do not reject the
exogeneity of the refereed articles, thus the result does not support the use of the 2SLS. Thus, we
treat refereed articles as an exogenous variable in the ordered probit equation.
Table 5 shows the ordered probit estimations results. We estimated two ordered probit models.
In Ordered Probit 1, where we control for the total number of refereed articles, the coe±cient for
(Articles) is positive (0.017) and highly statistically signi¯cant. The marginal e®ect indicates
that publishing one additional refereed article increases the probability that an academic has
worked in exactly two universities by 0.4%, in exactly three universities by 0.3% and in exactly
four universities by 0.03%. In Ordered Probit 2, where the model is estimated with controls
for (ArticlesJp) and (ArticlesUs), the coe±cient for articles published in the US and Europe
is statistically signi¯cant and positive (0.043). Refereed articles published in Japan have no
signi¯cant impact on labor mobility. The marginal e®ect indicates that publishing one additional
refereed article in the US or Europe increases the probability that an academic has worked in
exactly two universities by 1%, in exactly three universities by 0.6% and in exactly four universities
7by 0.06%. Thus, although the e®ect of refereed articles is statistically signi¯cant in both models,
the marginal e®ect appears to be small. In order to further examine the e®ect of the articles
published in the US and Europe on the labor mobility we have compared the probability that
an average academic (with average ArticlesUS=1.75) works at exactly two universities with the
probability of the academic whose publication rate is at the 90th percentile (ArticleUS=4).9 We
hold all the other variables constant at averages. The probability for the average academic is 34%
while the probability for the academic at the 90th percentile publication rate is 36%. Thus, the
di®erence appears to be minor.
Although we rejected the endogeneity of articles, it is still interesting to look at the coe±-
cients of the linear 2SLS estimation. Column three in Table 5 shows the results. The signi¯cant
coe±cients of the linear 2SLS are similar to those of the ordered probit models. In the 2SLS
estimation, the coe±cient for (Articles) is small and statistically insigni¯cant.
As mentioned above, our labor mobility variable, (#Univ worked), could be `contaminated'
with job changes resulted from forced turnover. Now we provide our assessment regarding the
degree of such a contamination in our data. Our assessment is that the contamination is not high
enough to alter the interpretation of the main results presented above. First, unlike in the US,
Japanese universities rarely have the `up-or-out' tenure track system. Most of the academics are
hired on life-time employment basis. In fact, 94.4% of our respondents are currently hired on
life-time basis.10 If an academic has been hired on the life-time contract since the initial hiring in
academia, job changes during career are likely to be voluntarily.
However, the enactment of the Legislation of the Fixed-Term System for Faculty Members in
1997 made it possible for universities to hire on ¯xed-term basis. Some ¯xed-term contracts have
no option for renewal. Under such a contract, job changes inevitably occur at the expiration of
the contract. If the contract is renewable, then job changes could occur due to the rejection of the
contract renewal. Such cases `contaminate' our results. Unfortunately, we can only tell whether
academics are currently hired on ¯xed-term basis, but we cannot tell if they have ever been hired
on ¯xed-term basis in the past. However, from the questionnaires we can tell the academic rank
at which each past job change occurred. We use this information to make an assessment about
the degree of `contamination'.
According to Yamanoi and Kuzuki (2005) only 1.9% of Japanese academics were hired on
¯xed-term basis in 2001. In 2005 still only 3.4 % were hired on ¯xed-term basis (Huang, 2006).
Among those hired on ¯xed-term basis, nearly 60% were lecturers in 2001 (Yamanoi and Kuzuki,
2005). Therefore, the job changes that occurred when academics were lecturers have the highest
probability of `contamination'. In our sample there are 32 academics who were hired in or after
1997 and who have experienced at least one job change. Among them ten were initially hired as
lecturers and experienced job mobility while they were in the rank of lecturer. Such job mobility
could be due to the rejection of contract renewal, thus contaminating our results. However, such
job changes are rather a small portion of all the job changes that occurred in our data set (220).
Therefore, we believe that the `contamination' is not severe.
In order to further asses the degree of contamination, we reconstructed the job mobility
variable by not counting the job change for the above mention ten cases. Results are almost
unchanged. In Ordered Probit 1 the coe±cient for (Articles) changed from (0.018) to (0.017)
and it remained statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. In Ordered Probit 2, the coe±cient for
9The di®erences between the mean productivity and the 75th percentile productivity is very small, thus we
decided to use the 90th percentile.
10In our questionnaire we asked if academics are hired on life-time basis (unlimited term contract) or on ¯xed-term
basis. In our sample only 5.6% are hired on the ¯xed-term basis (see Table 2).
8(ArticlesUs) changed from (0.044) to (0.043), but it remained statistically signi¯cant at the 5%
signi¯cance level. The coe±cient for (ArticlesJp) is unchanged at (0.013) and remained statis-
tically insigni¯cant. Thus, we believe that the `contamination' is not high enough to alter the
interpretation of the main result presented above.
In sum, our estimations indicate that refereed articles have a positive and statistically signi¯-
cant e®ect on labor mobility. Thus, academics within economics departments in Japan do appear
to be rewarded for publishing refereed articles in terms of labor mobility, although the e®ect of
the reward is rather small.
7. Conclusion
By using a data set of academic economists from Japanese universities, we estimated the e®ect
of refereed articles on salary, promotion and labor mobility. We found no e®ect of refereed articles
on salary and on promotion. However, we found a statistically signi¯cant e®ect of refereed articles
on labor mobility, but the magnitude of the e®ect is rather small. Publishing one additional
refereed article increases the probability that an academic has worked in exactly two universities
by 0.4%. In addition, we found that publishing one additional refereed article in the US or
Europe increases the probability that an academic has worked in exactly two universities by 1%.
Refereed articles published in Japan have no statistically signi¯cant impact on the probability
of working in more universities. We conclude that publishing refereed articles does not reward
Japanese economists as it does within US and UK academia, by a direct increase in salary and
accelerated promotion. Thus, our results are consistent with the beliefs within Japanese academia
that publications do not a®ect salary or promotion.
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10Table 1: De¯nitions of Variables
Name De¯nition
Articles Total no. of refereed articles
(single-authored + co-authored/2)(a)
ArticlesJp Total no. refereed articles published in Japan
(single-authored + co-authored/2)
ArticlesUs Total no. refereed published in the US, Europe & other
(single-authored + co-authored/2)
Female 1 if female, 0 if male
Age Age of respondent in 2008
Married 1 if ever married, 0 otherwise
Kids Number of children
AssocProf 1 if associate professor, 0 otherwise
FullProf 1 if full professor, 0 otherwise (b)
FixTerm 1 if on ¯xed employment contract, 0 if otherwise
Courses Total number of courses the respondent taught in 2008-09
Courses1st Number of courses taught for the ¯rst time in 2008-09
Courses2nd Number of courses taught for the second time in 2008-09
Admin 1 if respondent spends more than 50% of
working time on administration duties, 0 otherwise
Cohort80 1 if initially hired as academic in the 80s, 0 otherwise
Cohort90 1 if initially hired as academic in the 90s, 0 otherwise
Cohort00-03 1 if initially hired as academic between 2000-03, 0 otherwise
Cohort04 1 if initially hired as academic from 2004 onward, 0 otherwise
PrivUniv 1 if academic works in private university, 0 otherwise
PubUniv 1 if academic works in public university, 0 otherwise
BusinessDep 1 if academic works in business department, 0 otherwise
PhDO®er 1 if the department o®ers PhD or doctorate (DSc. or DEc.)(c)
IntGrant(in 10,000 yen) Amount of grant received from the department in 2007
IntGrant missing 1 if the amount of internal grant is missing observation
COE(in 10,000 yen) Individual amount of 2007 COE (Center of excellence) grant
COE missing 1 if the amount of COE is missing
Seniority Number of years worked at current employer
Experience Total number of years worked as academic
NonAcadExp Total number of years worked as non-academic
CareerBreak 1 if ever took career break, 0 otherwise
PhD 1 if holds a PhD, DSc. or DEc.
PhDOverseas 1 if holds a PhD, DSc. or DEc. from overseas
ExtGrant(in 10,000 yen) Amount of external grant from outside the university in 2007
(the amount is per individual)
ExtGrant missing 1 if the amount of external grant is missing observation
Publications missing 1 if the publication record is missing observation
History 1 if specialized in history of economic thought, 0 otherwise(d)
Theory 1 if specialized in theory, 0 otherwise
Quantitative 1 if specialized in quantitative methods, 0 otherwise
Econsystem 1 if specialized in economic systems, 0 otherwise
Growth 1 if specialized in growth, 0 otherwise
Monetary 1 if specialized in monetary economics, 0 otherwise
Fiscal 1 if specialized in ¯scal economics, 0 otherwise
International 1 if specialized in international economics, 0 otherwise
Business 1 if specialized in business, 0 otherwise
Indorg 1 if specialized in industrial organization, 0 otherwise
Labor 1 if specialized in labor economics, 0 otherwise
Urban 1 if specialized in urban & regional economics, 0 otherwise




Feduc Father's education in years
Meduc Mother's education in years
Meduc2 Mother's education squared
Feduc ¤ Meduc Father's education times mother's education
Dependent variables
Salary(in 10,000 yen) Total annual salary in 2008(e)
Rank 1 if associate professor, 2 if full professor, 0 otherwise
#Univ worked Total number of universities an academic has been
previously employed until 2008
(including the current university)
Notes: a) The number of articles is for the whole academic career until 2008; b) The excluded category includes
assistant professors and lecturers c) Doctor of Science (DSc.); Doctor of Economics (DEc.); d) Excluded categories
for the ¯eld of specialization are: natural resources, agricultural economics and the category `other ¯elds'; e)
The total annual salary includes the 12-month salary plus bonuses and allowances from the current institution;
f) Regressions include dummies for (Field missing), (Internal Grant missing), (COE missing), (External Grant
missing), (Publication missing). Sample averages were imputed for missing observations.
Table 2: Summary Statistics (N=337)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Articles 7.511 12.008 Experience 17.056 11.630
ArticlesJp 5.798 10.607 NonAcadExp 3.397 7.158
ArticlesUs 1.713 3.945 CareerBreak 0.042 0.200
Female 0.172 0.378 PhD 0.650 0.478
Age 49.463 11.317 PhDOverseas 0.104 0.306
Married 0.825 0.381 ExtGrant 69.039 189.411
Kids 1.226 1.179 ExtGrant missing 0.151 0.359
AssocProf 0.294 0.456 Publications missing 0.068 0.253
FullProf 0.626 0.485 History 0.187 0.390
FixTerm 0.056 0.231 Theory 0.033 0.178
Courses 3.024 1.620 Quantitative 0.033 0.178
Courses1st 0.467 0.852 Econsystem 0.050 0.219
Courses2nd 0.351 0.890 Growth 0.050 0.219
Admin 0.045 0.207 Monetary 0.074 0.262
Cohort80s 0.234 0.424 Fiscal 0.116 0.320
Cohort90s 0.261 0.440 International 0.071 0.258
Cohort00-03 0.151 0.359 Business 0.134 0.341
Cohort04 0.160 0.367 Indorg 0.033 0.178
PrivUniv 0.585 0.494 Labor 0.086 0.281
PubUniv 0.086 0.281 Urban 0.080 0.272
BusinessDep 0.042 0.200 Field missing 0.036 0.186
PhDO®er 0.674 0.470 Feduc 13.778 3.267
IntGrant 52.188 31.569 Meduc 12.322 2.329
IntGrant missing 0.021 0.143 Salary 1022.300 280.086
COE 7.086 27.088 Rank 1.546 0.640
COE missing 0.045 0.207 Univ worked 1.653 0.874
Seniority 12.739 10.545
12Table 3: Salary Equations (Dependent Variable = Log of Annual Salary) (N=337)
OLS 1 OLS 2 2SLS
Variables Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err.
Articles 0.001 0.001 - - 0.004 0.004
ArticlesJp - - 0.001 0.001 - -
ArticlesUs - - 0.002 0.003 - -
Female -0.068** 0.030 -0.067** 0.030 -0.065** 0.027
Age 0.115* 0.062 0.116* 0.062 0.137** 0.062
Age2 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002* 0.001
Age3 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001* 0.00001
Married 0.051** 0.025 0.051** 0.025 0.045* 0.024
Kids 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008
AssocProf 0.069 0.052 0.067 0.052 0.073 0.049
FullProf 0.198*** 0.061 0.196*** 0.060 0.204*** 0.060
FixTerm -0.229*** 0.073 -0.232*** 0.072 -0.220*** 0.071
Courses -0.010 0.007 -0.010 0.007 -0.011 0.007
Courses1st -0.011 0.016 -0.011 0.016 -0.009 0.014
Courses2nd 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.012
Admin 0.017 0.044 0.016 0.044 0.023 0.043
Cohort80s 0.024 0.046 0.024 0.046 0.027 0.044
Cohort90s 0.022 0.080 0.020 0.080 0.005 0.082
Cohort00-03 0.097 0.091 0.096 0.091 0.085 0.090
Cohort04 0.022 0.104 0.022 0.104 0.007 0.104
PrivUniv 0.171*** 0.019 0.170*** 0.019 0.168*** 0.018
PubUniv -0.018 0.031 -0.019 0.030 -0.026 0.031
BusinessDep 0.032 0.066 0.034 0.066 0.018 0.067
PhDO®er 0.080*** 0.020 0.080*** 0.020 0.081*** 0.019
IntGrant -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003
COE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Seniority 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.010
Seniority2 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Seniority3 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
Experience -0.011 0.023 -0.010 0.023 -0.015 0.021
Experience2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Experience3 -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00003 0.00002
NonAcadExp 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009
NonAcadExp2 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
NonAcadExp3 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002
CareerBreak -0.074 0.056 -0.074 0.056 -0.073 0.055
PhD 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.020 0.017 0.024
PhDOverseas 0.061** 0.026 0.057** 0.027 0.073** 0.031
ExtGrant 0.0001*** 0.00004 0.0001*** 0.00004 0.00009 0.00006
History 0.050** 0.023 0.051** 0.023 0.068** 0.032
Theory -0.024 0.058 -0.026 0.059 -0.002 0.055
Quantitative -0.043 0.073 -0.042 0.073 -0.028 0.071
Econsystem 0.065** 0.032 0.066** 0.033 0.070** 0.031
Growth 0.018 0.039 0.018 0.039 0.026 0.037
Monetary -0.009 0.027 -0.009 0.027 -0.009 0.027
Fiscal 0.001 0.028 0.002 0.028 0.017 0.033
International 0.027 0.036 0.025 0.037 0.018 0.033
Business 0.047* 0.025 0.049* 0.025 0.055** 0.026
Indorg -0.036 0.048 -0.036 0.048 -0.027 0.047
Labor 0.067* 0.035 0.068* 0.035 0.071** 0.031
13Table 3 Continued
OLS 1 OLS 2 2SLS
Variables Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err.
Urban 0.012 0.030 0.014 0.030 0.010 0.029
Constant 4.231 0.940 4.204 0.935 3.915 0.928
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 6: 2SLS - First Stage Results (Dependent Variable = Articles)(N=337)
Salary equation Linear promotion Linear labor mobility
Variables Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err.
Female -0.743 1.170 -0.778 1.160 -0.627 1.238
Age -6.447** 3.237 -6.602** 3.246 -3.575 4.115
Age2 0.139** 0.068 0.140** 0.068 0.074 0.087
Age3 -0.001** 0.0005 -0.001** 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006
Married 1.155 1.257 1.233 1.229 2.272* 1.371
Kids -0.447 0.893 -0.448 0.895 -0.957 0.822
AssocProf -1.590 1.738 - - 0.661 1.647
FullProf -3.098 2.505 - - -0.009 2.175
FixTerm -3.347 3.511 -2.784 3.269 - -
Courses 0.458 0.385 0.447 0.381 - -
Courses1st -0.505 0.869 -0.525 0.864 - -
Courses2nd -1.080* 0.577 -1.019* 0.555 - -
Admin -1.355 3.018 -1.483 3.016 - -
Cohort80s -0.705 3.558 -0.664 3.517 2.556 3.892
Cohort90s 4.069 6.577 4.058 6.471 4.095 6.773
Cohort00-03 2.056 8.146 2.094 8.169 2.616 7.961
Cohort04 3.408 9.962 3.594 9.955 5.594 9.574
PrivUniv 0.347 1.802 0.246 1.756 - -
PubUniv 2.658 2.112 2.546 2.091 - -
BusinessDep 4.749 3.949 4.403 3.867 - -
PhDDep -0.254 1.288 -0.253 1.290 - -
IntGrant 0.036* 0.023 0.035 0.022 - -
COE 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.023 - -
Seniority -0.427 0.736 -0.444 0.739 - -
Seniority2 0.037 0.041 0.038 0.041 - -
Seniority3 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 - -
Experience 1.265 1.275 1.103 1.250 1.385 1.084
Experience2 -0.066 0.064 -0.060 0.064 -0.065 0.061
Experience3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
NonAcadExp 0.625 0.512 0.630 0.513 0.804 0.544
NonAcadExp2 -0.012 0.068 -0.013 0.068 -0.022 0.070
NonAcadExp3 -0.0001 0.002 -0.0001 0.002 0.0000 0.002
CareerBreak -0.074 2.072 -0.068 2.063 -1.191 2.236
PhD 3.090* 1.685 2.917 1.658 5.569*** 1.467
PhDOverseas -3.214 2.120 -3.193 2.096 -3.007 2.076
ExtGrant 0.009** 0.004 0.009** 0.004 - -
History -5.397*** 1.942 -5.323*** 1.943 -6.627*** 1.673
Theory -7.030** 3.117 -6.831** 3.087 -6.212** 2.873
Quantitative -4.371** 1.881 -4.268** 1.885 -3.213 2.089
Econsystem -2.501 1.558 -2.364 1.545 -3.269** 1.626
Growth -2.638 1.818 -2.352 1.847 -3.519** 1.784
Monetary 0.126 3.289 -0.013 3.204 0.280 3.301
Fiscal -4.670*** 1.619 -4.654*** 1.614 -4.238** 1.689
International 2.360 4.504 2.413 4.501 3.141 4.185
Business -2.357 2.079 -2.430 2.060 -0.374 2.712
Indorg -2.460 3.335 -2.355 3.331 -2.291 3.100
Labor -1.771 1.885 -1.806 1.878 -1.940 1.668
Urban 1.171 2.562 1.007 2.547 2.347 3.434
Feduc 1.971* 1.037 1.887* 1.023 1.574 1.227
Meduc -2.744** 1.154 -2.713** 1.174 -3.287 1.257
Meduc2 0.215*** 0.069 0.210*** 0.070 0.222*** 0.075
19Table 6 Continued
Salary equation Linear promotion Linear labor mobility
Variables Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err. Coe®. Std.Err.
Feduc¤meduc -0.166** 0.083 -0.160* 0.082 -0.136*** 0.098
Constant 92.408 47.810 95.957 48.344 52.692 59.603
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.24 0.16
H0 (F-stat(p-val)) 2.55(0.039) 2.38(0.052) 2.47( 0.044)
Notes: 1) Standard errors are robust. ***Signi¯cant at the 1%, ** at the 5%, * at the 10% level. 2) H0: excluded
instruments not jointly signi¯cant.
20